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Abstract
Social media, such as blogs, are often seen as democratic entities that allow more voices to be heard than the
conventional mass or elite media. Some also feel that social media exhibits a balancing force against the arguably
slanted elite media. A systematic comparison between social and mainstream media is necessary but challenging
due to the scale and dynamic nature of modern communication. Here we propose empirical measures to quantify
the extent and dynamics of social (blog) and mainstream (news) media bias. We focus on a particular form of bias—
coverage quantity—as applied to stories about the 111th US Congress. We compare observed coverage of Members
of Congress against a null model of unbiased coverage, testing for biases with respect to political party, popular front
runners, regions of the country, and more. Our measures suggest distinct characteristics in news and blog media. A
simple generative model, in agreement with data, reveals differences in the process of coverage selection between
the two media.
“In the end, we’ll have more voices and more options.”
– Dan Gillmor, We the media
1 Introduction
Gillmor [1] envisioned social media, powered by the
growth of the Internet and related technologies, as a
form of grassroots journalism that blurs the line be-
tween producers and consumers and changes how in-
formation and opinions are distributed. He argued that
“the communication network itself will be a medium
for everyone’s voice, not just the few who can af-
ford to buy multimillion-dollar printing presses, launch
satellites, or win the government’s permission to squat
on the public airways.” This view has been embraced
by activists who consider social media as a balancing
force to the conventionally assumed slanted or biased
elite media. Indeed, social media can be used by under-
privileged citizens, promising a profound impact and a
healthy democracy.
Many believe that the mainstream media is slanted,
but disagree about the direction of slant. The conven-
tional belief about media bias has held for decades,
but attempts at developing objective measurement have
only recently begun. The study by Groseclose and Mi-
lyo [2] showed the presence of bias in mass media
(cable and print news) and new media (Internet web-
sites, etc.). Their results, despite receiving criticism,
are fairly consistent with conventional wisdom. On the
other hand, researchers have observed an “echo cham-
ber” effect within the new media – people select par-
ticular news to reinforce their existing beliefs and atti-
tudes. Iyengar and Hahn [3] argued that such selective
exposure is especially likely in the new media environ-
ment due to information overload. With search, filter-
ing, and communication technologies, people can eas-
ily discover and disseminate information that are sup-
portive or consistent with their existing beliefs.
Do social media exhibit more or less bias than mass
media and, if so, to what extent? Identifying media
bias is challenging for a number of reasons. First, bias
is not easy to observe. It has been recognized that “bias
is in the eyes of the beholder” meaning that, e.g., con-
servatives tend to believe that there is a liberal bias in
the media while liberals tend to believe there is a con-
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servative bias [2, 4]. Hence, finding textual indicators
of bias is difficult, if not impossible. Second, the as-
sessment of bias usually implies knowing what “fair-
ness” would be, which may not be available or consis-
tent across different viewpoints. Third, Internet-based
communication promises easy, inexpensive, and instant
information distribution, which not only increases the
number of online media outlets, but also the amount
and frequency of information and opinions delivered
through these outlets. The scale and dynamic nature of
today’s communication should be accounted for.
In this paper, our major contribution is that we pro-
pose empirical measures to quantify the extent and dy-
namics of “bias” in mainstream and social media (here-
after referred to as News and Blogs, respectively). Our
measurements are not normative judgment, but exam-
ine bias by looking at the attributes of those being men-
tioned, against a null model of “unbiased” coverage.
We focus on the number of times a member of the
111th US congress was referenced, and study the dis-
tribution and dynamics of the references within a large
set of media outlets. We consider “the unbiased” as a
configurable baseline distribution and measure how the
observed coverage deviates from this baseline, with the
measurement uncertainty of observations taken into ac-
count. We demonstrate bias measures for slants in fa-
vor of specific political parties, popular front-runners,
or certain geographical regions. Using these measures
to examine newly collected data, we have observed dis-
tinct characteristics of how News and Blogs cover the
US congress. Our analysis of party and ideological bias
indicates that Blogs are not significantly less slanted
than News. However, their slant orientations are more
sensitive to exogenous factors such as national elec-
tions. In addition, blogs’ interests are less concentrated
on particular front-runners or regions than news out-
lets.
While our measures are independent of content, we
further investigate two aspects of the content related to
our measures: the hyperlinks embedded in articles and
sentiments detected from the articles. The hyperlink
patterns suggest that outlets with a Democrat-slant (D-
slant for short) are more likely to cite each other than
outlets with a Republican-slant (R-slant). The senti-
ment analysis suggests there is a weak correlation be-
tween negative sentiments and our measures.
To better understand the distinctive slant structures
between the two media, we propose to use a sim-
ple “wealth allotment” model to explain how legisla-
tors gain attention (references) from different media.
The results about blog media’s inclination to a rich-
get-richer mechanism indicates they are more likely to
echo what others have mentioned. This observation
does not contradict our measures of bias – compared
with news media, blogs are weaker adherents to par-
ticular parties, front-runners or regions but are more
susceptible to the network and exogenous factors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We
first discuss related work, followed by the details of
our collected data. We then detail the different types of
coverage bias and how to quantify them and then ex-
amine the results, both structurally (via hyperlinking)
and textually (via text-based sentiment analysis). Fi-
nally, we present a simple generative model of media
coverage and conclude with a discussion of open issues
and future work.
2 Related Work
Concerns about mainstream media bias have been a
controversial and critical subject in journalism due to
the media’s power to shape a democratic society. Stud-
ies on media bias can involve surveys and interviews
[5], and content analysis [6], as well as theoretical
models such as structural economic causes. Apart from
these qualitative arguments, Groseclose and Milyo [2]
proposed a media bias measure that counts how often
a particular media outlet cites various think tanks and
policy groups.
There have been controversial responses to prior
studies, and the origin in part lies in the difficulty to
separate the recognition of bias from the belief of bias.
A dependence on viewers’ beliefs has been observed in
studies [2, 4], which is relevant to the theories on how
supply-side forces or profit-related factors cause slants
in media [7, 8]. Because of such a dependency, compu-
tationally identifying bias from media content remains
an emerging research topic, and requires insights from
other language analysis studies such as sentiment anal-
ysis [9] or partisan features in texts [10, 8].
While mass media have the ability to affect the pub-
lic’s interests, social media represent large samples of
expression from both influencers and those being influ-
enced. Hence the “crowd voice” collected in social me-
dia has attracted considerable research. The viral be-
havior and predictive power of social media in response
to politics, the economy and other areas has been exam-
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ined in recent studies [11, 12]. For example, Leskovec
et al. [11] tracked the traversal of “memes” based on
short distinctive phrases echoed by online news and
blogs over time. Another work by O’Connor et al. [12]
studied the relationship between tweet sentiments and
polls in order to examine how the sentiments express-
esed in the Twitter microblogging social media can be
used as political or economic indicators.
In this paper, we do not attempt to tackle the compu-
tationally difficult task of identifying bias in media text.
Instead, we study the characteristics of the two media
based on purely quantitative measures independent of
media content. We are interested in studying the role
of today’s social media, and we hope our analysis will
contribute to the growing understanding of this subject.
3 Data Model
3.0.1 Data Collection
Our data is based on RSS feeds aggregated by Open-
Congress12. OpenCongress is a non-profit, non-
partisan public resource website that brings together
official government data with timely information about
what is happening in Congress. We continuously mon-
itor and collect the OpenCongress RSS feeds for each
individual member of Congress3. This paper exam-
ines News and Blogs coverage about the 111th US
Congress, both Senators and Representatives. The
dataset spans from September 1 to January 4, covering
the 2010 mid-term election on November 2.
Figure 1 shows the volume (total number of news
articles or blog posts) over time in this dataset. The
central peak corresponds to the mid-term election. In
total, there are 57,221 news articles and 66,830 blog
posts being collected in the four-month period.
3.0.2 Networked Data Model
We study the structure of the two media by constructing
a modal network containing different types of nodes
and edges. The network structure is illustrated in
Fig. 2. More specifically, we have:
1www.opencongress.org
2OpenCongress uses Daylife (www.daylife.com) and
Technorati (technorati.com) to aggregate articles from these
feeds. The possible selection biases in these filtering processes are
not considered in this paper.
3An example news/blog coverage feed can be found at
http://www.opencongress.org/people/news_
blogs/300075_Lisa_Murkowski
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Figure 1: The volume (total number of news articles or blog
posts) over time. The highest peak corresponds to the mid-
term election.
Nodes There are three sets of nodes: a news set, de-
noted by VN, that contains 5,149 news outlets, a
blog set VB of 19,693 blogs4, and a legislator set
VL that covers 530 lawmakers.
Edges Each edge eik records when media outlet i pub-
lishes an article referencing legislator k. We ex-
tract 64,222 such edges in 46,501 news articles,
denoted as edge set ENL, and 91,837 edges in
62,301 blog posts, denoted as EBL. Edges are as-
sociated with timestamps and texts.
Node attributes For legislators, we record attributes
such as party, district, etc., based on the legisla-
tors’ profiles and external data sources.
While we focus on “reference” or citation edges, this
networked model can also include other types of edges,
e.g. hyperlinks between outlets, voting preferences
among legislators, etc.
4 Types of Bias
In journalism, the term “media bias” refers to the se-
lection of which events and stories are reported and
how they are covered within the mass media. The
most commonly discussed biases include reporting that
supports (or attacks) particular political parties, candi-
dates, ideologies, corporations, races, etc. In this paper,
we begin with perhaps the simplest form of measurable
bias – the distribution of coverage quantity, i.e. how
many times an entity of interest is referenced by a me-
dia outlet. We argue that, regardless of a positive or
4We also have a small number of blogs hosted by mass media
news outlets, e.g. CNN (blog). This paper does not include analysis
of such blogs.
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Figure 2: The networked data model. There are three types
of nodes: news outlets, blog outlets and legislators. An edge
pointing toward a legislator represents each time an outlet
references that legislator in an article or post.
negative stance towards an entity, an imbalanced quan-
tity of coverage, if present, is itself a form of bias5.
An outlet’s references can be biased in a number of
ways:
Party References are focused on a particular political
party.
Front-runner References are concentrated on a few
legislators who we term “front-runners”, while the
majority of legislators receive little or no atten-
tion.
Region References focus on certain geographical lo-
cations.
Ideology An ideology is a collection of ideas spanning
the political spectrum. Ideological bias indicates
that frequently referenced legislators favor certain
ideological tendencies.
Gender The preference towards covering legislators
of one gender.
We discuss how to measure different types of bias in
a unified model. Other types of bias, such as those in
favor of a particular race or ethnic group, can also be
measured through our method.
Based on the measurements associated with individ-
ual media outlets, we derive system-wide bias mea-
sures that allow us to characterize and compare the bias
structure between the news and blog media.
5Our view on the meaningfulness of a measurement based
solely on quantity is similar to the study of Groseclose and Milyo
[2].
5 Quantifying Bias
In this section, we describe our method for quantifying
and comparing bias in News and Blogs.
5.0.3 Notation
Let ncik be number of times media outlet i references
legislators in group k, where c ∈ {News, Blogs} is the
media category (c is omitted when there is no need to
distinguish the categories). In the case of measuring
party bias, k ∈ {D,R} indicates the Democratic or
Republican political parties. Let ni =
∑
k nik be the
total number of references made by outlet i. We be-
gin with a specific case – measuring the two-party bias,
and then describe a more general model for measuring
other types of bias.
5.1 Party Slant
A naive approach for measuring an outlet’s biased cov-
erage of two political parties is to compare the number
of times members in each party are referenced. The ra-
tio of the reference counts of one party against the other
may be used to compare outlets that reference different
parties with different frequencies. There are two issues
with this approach: (i) this ratio may lack statistical
significance for some outlets, and (ii) it assumes that
fair coverage of the two parties requires roughly equal
quantities of references to each.
To resolve these issues, we use the log-odds-ratio as
follows. We define θik, the “slant score” of outlet i to
party k, as
θik = log(odds-ratio) = log
(
nik/(ni − nik)
pk/(1− pk)
)
, (1)
where pk is the baseline probability that i refers to k,
and here we assume this variable is fixed for all i. The
advantage of having such a baseline probability is that
“fairness” become configurable. For example, one can
consider fairness as a 50-50 chance to reference either
party (i.e. pD = pR = 0.5). One can also define
pD = 0.6 since roughly 60% of the studied legislators
are Democrats. No matter what baseline probability is
given, we have a simple interpretation: θ = 0 means
no bias w.r.t that baseline. In this two-party case, we
take θi ≡ θik, with k = D, and θi > 0 means outlet i is
more likely to be D-slanted. A slant score with value α
can be interpreted as follows: the number of times out-
let i references Democratic legislators is eα times more
than if those references followed the baseline.
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Figure 3: The scatter plot of number of references (obser-
vations) against party (left) and front-runner (right) slant
scores for News and Blogs. Outlets with less than 20 articles
are not shown.
Table 1: Slant scores θ for major news outlets and most
slanted blogs. For party slant, a positive (negative) score
means the outlet is likely to be D-slanted (R-slanted). For
front-runner and regional slant, a larger score indicates the
outlet is more focused on few particular legislators or states.
Party (θ) Front-runner (θ) Region (θ)
N
ew
s
nbc (0.51) washington post (1.03) los angeles times (1.30)
new york times (0.07) cnn (1.02) nbc (1.19)
washington post (-0.01) fox (0.91) cbs (1.12)
abc (-0.03) wall street journal (0.86) cnn (1.04)
cbs (-0.03) cbs (0.84) washington times (1.00)
los angeles times (-0.07) nbc (0.83) u.s. news (0.98)
newshour (-0.10) los angeles times (0.82) wall street journal (0.96)
cnn (-0.11) msnbc (0.74) usa today (0.96)
fox (-0.13) u.s. news (0.71) washington post (0.95)
npr (-0.14) new york times (0.70) msnbc (0.92)
wall street journal (-0.15) washington times (0.70) npr (0.92)
u.s. news (-0.22) usa today (0.66) new york times (0.89)
bbc (-0.38) npr (0.64) abc (0.87)
usa today (-0.39) abc (0.61) fox (0.84)
msnbc (-0.39) newshour (0.32) newshour (0.78)
washington times (-0.96) bbc (0.00) bbc (0.20)
B
lo
gs
dissenting times (5.22) arlnow.com (9.41) blue jersey (8.32)
cool wicked stuff (3.89) janesville (9.05) [...] virginia politics (7.86)
justicedenied13501 (3.58) take back idaho’s [...] (8.84) politics on the hudson (7.34)
polifrog.com (3.54) moral science club (8.84) calwatchdog (7.23)
dennis miller (3.46) murray for congress (8.67) staradvertiser [...] (7.19)
The slant score’s variance is given by the Mantel-
Haenszel estimator [13]:
Var(θi) =
1
nik
+
1
ni − nik +
1
nipk
+
1
ni(1− pk) . (2)
The variance gives the significance of the slant score
measure, which relies on the number of observations
(ni and nik) we have for each outlet.
Figure 3 (a) shows the number of references as a
function of party slant scores for outlets with more than
20 articles in our dataset. The distribution of outlets’
slant scores appears to be roughly symmetric in both
directions, and outlets making more references tend to
be less slanted. Table 1 lists the slant scores for some
major news outlets and the most slanted blogs.
Table 2: The collective slant scores. Parenthetical values
indicate standard deviation of the measured slant score.
House Senate
Θcon Θpop Θcon Θpop
Party News -0.02 (0.02) -0.06 (0.02) -0.22 (0.03) -0.45 (0.04)Blogs -0.11 (0.02) -0.15 (0.02) -0.18 (0.04) -0.41 (0.04)
Ideology News -0.05 (0.02) -0.08 (0.02) -0.19 (0.04) -0.45 (0.04)Blogs -0.16 (0.02) -0.19 (0.02) -0.12 (0.04) -0.39 (0.04)
Gender News -0.26 (0.04) 0.07 (0.03) -0.28 (0.06) 0.45 (0.05)Blogs -0.29 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) -0.32 (0.07) 0.41 (0.06)
Front- News 0.68 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 0.66 (0.02) 0.55 (0.03)
runner Blogs 0.33 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01) 0.39 (0.02) 0.29 (0.03)
Region News 0.97 (0.01) -0.13 (0.01) 0.76 (0.01) 0.45 (0.03)Blogs 0.61 (0.01) -0.21 (0.02) 0.44 (0.02) 0.18 (0.03)
5.1.1 Summary statistics
In order to characterize the overall bias within a me-
dia, we derive a system-wide bias measure based on
the individual outlets’ measures. We use a random ef-
fect model, which assumes not only variation within
each outlet, but also variation across different outlets in
the system. More specifically, the model assumes that
the slant scores for n outlets (θ1, . . . , θn) are sampled
from N (θ, τ2), and there are two sources of variation:
the variance between outlets τ2 and the variance within
outlets σ2. Hence, the model is given by
θˆi ∼ N (θ, σ2 + τ2). (3)
We use the DerSimonian-Laird estimator [14] to ob-
tain θ∗ and Var(θ∗), where θ∗ is the asymptotically
unbiased estimator for θ. The media-wide collective
party slant score, Θ, is defined as Θ ≡ θ∗ with a
±1.96√Var(θ∗) confidence interval.
Table 2 summarizes slants with respect to different
baselines. The measure Θcon is based on the party
composition of members in Congress, and Θpop is
based on the fraction of the US population represented
by the legislators (in each party). The statistical signif-
icance of each measure is represented by the variance.
Note that in this two-party case, a different baseline can
be obtained simply by shifting the score. For example,
if one chooses to use pD = pR = 0.5 as the baseline
probability, the measure Θ0.5 can be calculated from
Θcon by adding log( pD1−pD ) ≈ 0.405 (where in terms of
Congress composition pD ≈ 0.6).
We also separate our measures for referencing mem-
bers of the House and Senate to see if outlets ex-
hibit different slants when covering the two chambers.
Evaluated on the party percentage baseline, both me-
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dia show R-slant when referencing Senators, and blogs
are more R-slanted when referencing members of the
House. Hence Blogs are overall more R-slanted than
News. This interpretation depends on what baseline
is chosen, however. For example, if we choose to use
the 50-50 convention, both media become D-slanted.
However, it is important to note that the absolute dif-
ference between the bias measures for the two media
do not change with baseline.
5.2 Slant Dynamics
To study how media bias may change over time, we
calculate the slant scores using references made during
running windows. We measure Θ(t, w) as a function of
time t and window length w. Figure 4 shows the tem-
poral slant scores for the two media during the four-
month period, based on a w = 2-week running win-
dow. The slant of both media changes slightly after the
mid-term election: Compared with their pre-election
slants, News become slightly more R-slanted when ref-
erencing Senators and Blogs are more R-slanted when
referencing Representatives. Overall, the media, es-
pecially Blogs, become more R-slanted after election.
This is reasonable due to the Republican victories.
These results raise an important question: do the
majority of outlets become more R-slanted after the
election, or do R-slanted outlets become more active
while D-slanted outlets become quieter? To examine
what caused the slant change we plot in Fig. 5 the
change in slant score ∆θi = θi(t2) − θi(t1), where
t1 ∈ [Sep. 1, Oct. 30] and t2 ∈ [Nov. 7, Jan. 4], for
each outlet against its slant score before the election.
(Point size indicates the amount of references observed
after the election.) We use a linear regression to quan-
tify the slant change. Surprisingly, we see media out-
lets shifted slightly toward the other side after the elec-
tion regardless of their original slants, but overall the
originally D-slanted outlets become more R-slanted.
5.3 Front-Runner Slant
To evaluate whether or not the media pay exces-
sive attention on popular front-runners, we extend the
dichotomous-outcome measure used in the previous
section. We consider a generalization of the odds ra-
tio proposed by Agresti [15].
Let ncik now be the number of times outlet i refers
to the k-th legislator, where c ∈ {News, Blogs} as be-
fore, and k ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} is the rank index for one
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Figure 4: Slant score as a function of time. Overall, the
media, especially Blogs, become more R-slanted after the
2010 election.
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Figure 5: Media outlets are slightly shifting towards the
other side after election. The majority of news outlets be-
come slightly more R-slanted. For blogs, originally D-
slanted blogs become more R-slanted. Each point represents
a media outlet.
of the L legislators, ordered by the number of refer-
ences received from outlet i. We can replace nik by the
sample proportion pik = nik/ni. The slant score θi of
outlet i is defined by a generalized log-odds-ratio:
θi = log
(∑
j>k pikpj∑
j<k pikpj
)
, (4)
where pj is, again, the baseline probability that i refers
to the j-th legislator, and the {pj} can be chosen to be
uniform or any other distribution. For convenience we
commonly fix the baseline distribution for all i.
When L = 2, Eq. 4 reduces to a dichotomous-
outcome log-odds-ratio measure similar to Eq. 1.
When L > 2 and the {pj} are not uniform, changing
to a different baseline is not a simple linear shift. With
6
Eq. 4, a slant score with value α can be interpreted as
follows: the number of times outlet i mentions high
ranked legislators is eα times more than if the legisla-
tors were ranked according to their baseline probabili-
ties.
The variance in the slant score is now given by [15]:
Var(θi) =
∑
j pij (αij)
2 +
∑
j pj (βij)
2
ni
(∑
k>j pikpj
)2 (5)
where
αij = θi
∑
k<j
pk −
∑
k>j
pk, βij = θi
∑
k>j
pik −
∑
k<j
pik.
Figure 3 (b) plots the number of references (obser-
vations) against front-runner slant scores for media and
blog outlets with more than 20 posts in our dataset. We
expect the frontrunner slant scores to be mostly posi-
tive since the legislators are already ranked by popular-
ity (nik).
The system-wide frontrunner slant score for both
news and blog media can be calculated as before. Table
2 summarizes front-runner slants with respect to vari-
ous baselines. Note that the two media show differ-
ent biases when referencing the two chambers: Blogs
are more front-slanted than news about Senators, while
news outlets are more front-slanted when referencing
Representatives.
5.4 Other Types of Slant
5.4.1 Ideology
The concept of ideology is closely related to that of po-
litical party – members of the same party usually share
similar or less contradictory ideologies. We study the
ideological bias using a method similar to the party
slant analysis. We first locate each legislator relative
to an identifiable ideological orientation such as left or
right, and then use the dichotomous-outcome measure
to obtain ideological slant scores for individual outlets
as well as system-wide scores for News and Blogs.
We use the DW-NOMINATE scores for the
U.S. Congress [16] as measures of legislators’ ideo-
logical locations6. The estimates are based on the his-
tory of roll call votes by the members of Congress
6Based on their method, each member’s ideological point is es-
timated along two dimensions. Previous research has shown that
– the first dimension reveals standard left-right or economic cleav-
ages, and the second dimension reflects social and sectional divi-
sions. In this paper we use only the first dimension.
and have been widely used in political science stud-
ies and related fields. We classify each legislator as
either ideologically-left or -right, based on the sign of
their estimates7. We then calculate the ideological slant
score θik, k ∈ {Left, Right} for each outlet i with
k = Left so that θi > 0 indicates outlet i is more likely
to be Left-slanted.
Our ideological slant measurements are also summa-
rized in Table 2. We find this measure is highly corre-
lated with the party slant measurement (with Pearson
correlation r = 0.958 and p < 10−5). This suggests
that, while party members may be found at different
positions in the left-right spectrum, media outlets tend
to pick legislators who are representatives of the two
parties’ main ideologies, such as Left-wing Democrats
or Right-wing Republicans.
5.4.2 Gender
Gender is also treated as a dichotomous variable, where
θi > 0 indicates that the coverage of outlet i favors
male legislators. The results, summarized in Table 2,
show that blogs have a slightly stronger female-slant
than news. However, when considering the population
baseline, the slant for both media is significant for the
Senate but nearly insignificant for the House. The gen-
der composition in both chambers is similar – 20% of
the members are women. The differences in the esti-
mates based on different baselines reflect a very dif-
ferent voter population represented by the female/male
legislators in both chambers.
5.4.3 Region
We consider region as a categorical variable. For each
legislator, the state or territory of his or her district
is used. The region slant is calculated like the front-
runner slant: the slant score θi is defined as per Eqs. 4
and 5, where k ∈ {1, 2, ..., S} is the rank index for one
of the S states in the US, ordered by the number of ref-
erences received from outlet i. The results are again
summarized in Table 2. Overall, news outlets show a
much stronger regional bias than blogs. The negative
slant scores in the House, based on the population base-
line, indicate outlets’ favor those representatives from
more populous states.
7Estimates for the 111th Congress are available at: http://
voteview.spia.uga.edu/dwnomin.htm
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6 Examining Coverage
As mentioned earlier, the slant scores of media outlets
are calculated based only on the quantity of references
to legislators, and are independent of the coverage con-
tent. In this section, we examine two intrinsic aspects
of this coverage, the hyperlinks between outlets and the
sentiments of the textual content, as related to the party
slants.
6.1 Links
We extract the hyperlinks embedded in each news arti-
cle or blog post and study how media outlets with dif-
ferent slants link to one another. Using the sign of
the party slant score θp, we divide News and Blogs
into four sectors: D-slanted news, R-slanted news, D-
slanted blogs, and R-slanted blogs.
Table 3 shows the prevalence of links among the four
sectors. Each entry (i, j) represents the total number
of hyperlinks from outlets in category i pointing to the
articles of outlets in category j. The linking pattern
exhibits interesting phenomena: first and the most ob-
vious characteristic between the two media is that news
outlets have far fewer hyperlinks in their articles com-
pared with blog posts. Blogs with more hyperlinks can
also be seen as second-hand reporters or commenta-
tors in response to some news articles and other blog
posts. Second, articles in the D-slanted outlets, includ-
ing news and blogs, are more likely to be cited, includ-
ing by outlets with the opposite slant. For example, the
R-slanted blogs have a large number of hyperlinks to
the D-slanted news outlets. Third, the matrix shows a
strong assortativity [17] in the D-slanted community –
the D-slanted blogs are more likely to cite articles from
D-slanted news and blogs than the R-slanted blogs are
to cite R-slanted news and blogs. In fact, linking pat-
terns among the R-slanted community appear to be dis-
assortative. It would be interesting to compare our re-
sults with those of Adamic, et al. [18].
6.2 Texts
Our slant estimation is based on how many times an
outlet references a legislator, regardless of positive or
negative attitude. Without any sentiment information,
the estimated scores need to be interpreted carefully:
a significant slant score only reflects the existence of
bias, but not the polarity (if any) of such bias. This sub-
section describes our attempt to study sentiment infor-
mation within the media. We employ the OpenAmplify
Table 3: The strength of hyperlinks among News and Blogs
with Democrat or Republican slants. Each entry (i, j) rep-
resents the total number of hyperlinks from category i to j.
News (R) News (D) Blogs (R) Blogs (D)
News (R) 99 125 68 67
News (D) 84 234 69 152
Blogs (R) 256 500 287 293
Blogs (D) 298 895 299 623
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Figure 6: Joint probability density for negative sentiment
and party slant score. Solid line is the averaged trend. We
see that D-slanted media are positively correlated with θ
while R-slanted media are negatively correlated (r: corre-
lation coefficient; p: p-value).
APIs8 to extract the sentiment information of each ref-
erence. The APIs return, for each article, the detected
name entities and the sentiment values associated with
the entities. We derive sentiment information for (out-
let, legislator) pairs by matching legislator names to the
names detected in each article, then aggregate the sen-
timent scores associated with these legislators over all
of the outlet’s articles. The sentiment scores for par-
ties can be derived from the scores received by party
members.
Figure 6 shows the probability density of the resul-
tant negative sentiment scores against the party slant
scores. The results show a weak correlation between
sentiment values and the party slant scores. Outlets’
sentiments for Democratic legislators are positively
correlated to their slant scores, while sentiments for
Republican legislators are negatively correlated. This
suggests the outlets with slants to a particular party
tend to mention that party less negatively. Then ten-
dency is easier to discover in Blogs than in News, but
this can be caused by differences in the use of language
rather than the level of bias.
8http://community.openamplify.com/
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7 Modeling the reference-generating
process
What are the underlying mechanisms governing how
News and Blogs choose to reference legislators? Are
there similarities or differences between these two me-
dia? We propose to use a simple generative model [19]
for the probability P (n) that a legislator is referenced a
total of n times. Comparing the results of the model’s
isolated mechanism with the actual data will give intu-
ition about factors contributing to the observed P (n).
The model is as follows. Initially (t = 0), we as-
sume9 a single reference to some legislator k′ such
that nk(0) = δ(k, k′), for all k. At each time step
the media (News or Blogs) selects a random legisla-
tor to reference in an article. With probability q, how-
ever, the media rejects that legislator and instead ref-
erences a legislator with probability proportional to his
or her current coverage. That is, at each time step t,
nk(t+ 1) = nk(t) + 1 occurs with probability pk(t):
pk(t) =
{
1/ |VL| with prob. 1− q ,
nk(t)/
∑
k′ nk′(t) with prob. q.
(6)
This captures the intuitive “rich-get-richer” notion of
fame, while the parameter q tunes its relative strength.
Those legislators lucky (or newsworthy) enough to be
referenced early on are likely to become heavily ref-
erenced, since they have more opportunities to receive
references, especially as q increases. Since one ref-
erence is handed out at each timestep, the total num-
ber of references measured empirically fixes the times-
pan over which the model is run; |VL| is also fixed,
so the model has one parameter, q. Asymptotically
(|VL| → ∞), this model gives a pure power law
P (n) ∼ n−1−1/q for all q > 0 [19]. The distribution of
n is more complex for finite |VL|, however, obtaining
a gaussian-like form for q < 1/2 and a heavy-tailed
distribution for q > 1/2.
Figure 7 compares the observed P (n) with that gen-
erated using the model process. We observe good
qualitative agreement, better than fitted poisson or log-
normal distributions, although there is a slight tendency
to overestimate popular legislators and underestimate
unpopular legislators. The empirical distributions also
exhibit a slight bimodality, perhaps due to the 2010
9This initial condition differs from the flat start of Bagrow, et
al. [19], with important consequences for finite-time models.
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Figure 7: The generative model for the distribution of refer-
ences n per legislator. The larger value of q for Blogs indi-
cates that they are more driven by the rich-get-richer mech-
anism than News, although both distributions are heavy-
tailed. Dashed lines indicated fitted poisson and log-normal
distributions, for comparison.
election, that is not captured by the model. The larger
value of q for Blogs than for News provides evidence
that Blogs collectively are more driven by a rich-get-
richer selection process than News, although this may
not hold at the individual outlet level.
The measures of front-runner slant indicate that
News have a stronger front-runner bias than Blogs.
This seems to conflict with the reference generating
model, which showed that blog behavior is more ex-
plainable by the rich-get-richer mechanism (q is larger
for Blogs than for News). However, we argue that the
measures and the model are in fact consistent, since
the model only treats the aggregate of the entire media
class – the stronger front-runner bias in News outlets
means that each outlet is more likely to reference their
own intrinsic set of front-runners, which may be dif-
ferent from others’; for Blogs, the “stickiness” of their
individual set of front-runners is weaker and hence over
time globally popular front-runners are more likely to
emerge. Further examination of this argument would
be to explicitly model the bias of individual outlets.
This one-parameter model neglects a number of dy-
namical features that may be worth future pursuit. For
example, generalizations may be able to explain tem-
poral dynamics of the references, the joint distributions
nik between media outlet i and legislator k, etc.
8 Discussion and Open Issues
Our results show that News and Blogs, in aggregate,
have only slightly different slants in terms of party and
ideology. However, the dynamics of the party slant
measures suggest blogs are more sensitive to exoge-
nous shocks, such as the mid-term election. Our obser-
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vations were made over a short, four-month timeframe,
yet long-term, continuous tracking of slant dynamics
would be necessary to reveal any consistently different
dynamical behavior between the two media.
Our measures and model are solely based on the
quantity of coverage. We have conducted preliminary
sentiment analysis using an off-the-shelf tool and com-
pared the extracted sentiment results with our mea-
sures. The results suggest a weak connection between
the quantity and semantics of referencing a subject. It
would be worth investigating the accuracy of sentiment
detection on different media content and how sentiment
analysis can be used to identify bias from texts. In ad-
dition, critical content analysis (which examines not
only the text but also the relationship with audience)
and multivariate analysis (since multiple types of slants
are inter-related) may be leveraged for further analysis.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop system-wide bias measures
to quantify bias in mainstream and social media, based
on the number of times media outlets reference to the
members of the 111th US Congress. In addition to
empirical measurements, we also present a generative
model to explore how each media’s global distribution
of the number of references per legislator evolves over
time. We observe that social media are indeed more
social, i.e. more affected by network and exogenous
factors, resulting in a more heavily-skewed and un-
even distribution of popularity. Perhaps, there are more
voices than ever, but many are echoes.
We plan to continue work along the lines discussed
in the previous section, such as long-term tracking of
slant dynamics in the two media, modeling individ-
ual outlets’ biases, and leveraging content analysis and
multivariate analysis.
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